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Abstract
The question “what is Bitcoin” allows for many answers depending on the objectives
aimed at when providing such answers. The question addressed in this paper is to deter-
mine a top-level classification, or type, for Bitcoin. We will classify Bitcoin as a system
of type money-like informational commodity (MLIC).
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cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.
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1 Introduction
For an artifact X we will denote with BT(X) the class of base types of X . We do not claim
that each artifact X has a base type. A base type of X should express a characteristic property
or objective for X . We intend to apply our analysis in the case that X= Bitcoin, and we will
assume that Bitcoin is an artifact.1
We will use a notational distinction between X , a term from some syntax, and m(X), the
meaning of X in the world. Most plausibly m(X) is not a term from some syntax. The
question “what is m(Bitcoin)” is not easy to answer. Informatics provides no answers to
such questions because it is initially unclear which aspects of Bitcoin, when viewed as an
operational distributed software system with an evolving human user community, must be
taken into account.
Base types for X need not be unique. For instance if X is an airplane (say it is of type A
for airplane) and at the same time X is a propellor airplane (say it is of type type Ap) then
both A and Ap may be considered
to be base types for X (that is members of BT(X)). In this case Ap is a subtype of A.
Evidently different base types for X must have a non-empty intersection because m(X) is
included in the extension of each base type for X . Extensions of base types of X are partially
ordered, but not necessarily totally ordered, by the subset relation for their extensions.
An optimal base type, if it exists, is concise, that is its description is simple, and at the
same time it is informative. These two criteria work in opposite directions. Finding an optimal
base type for an artifact class2 may be impossible or unrewarding. For instance looking for
a base type for “organization” is probably pointless, because “organization” is best seen as a
base type itself.
We will be interested in the case where X= Bitcoin.
1.1 Looking for an ontology of monies
Our contribution aims at a conceptualization of a part of the area of money. A conceptualiza-
tion may precede formalization in an ontology (for instance making use of the ologs of [40]),
and codification of the ontology in dedicated notation such as OWL ([27]). Conventional
money, informational money, and money-like commodities, together span a wealth of possi-
bilities for which a sound and stable ontological framework can be developed and combined
with existing ontological frameworks such as the enterprise ontology of [41].
1.2 Defining versus typing
When considering a class term Y for some kind of entities with Y still vaguely specified by
means of keywords or combinations thereof, the objective may arise to define “being a Y ” in
1Obviously, the artifact called Bitcoin is a carrier for an activity (process or system) that involves human
agents as well, and which for that reason cannot be understood as an artifact.
2Instead of artifact class one may prefer to speak of an artifact kind. For a discussion of monies from the
perspective of natural kinds and artifact kinds see [9].
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a more rigorous fashion. We write |Y | for the extension of Y , that is the class of all of its
members. In practice membership of |Y |may be a matter of degree, plausibility, or probability.
For instance with Y= “car” (a word serving as a class term), |Y | is the collection of all cars.3
The extension |Y | of Y may vary in time, we write |Y |t for the extension of Y at time t.
Now one may wish to consider a particular definition Yd of Y . We write |Yd| for the
extension of Yd. Conceivably |Yd| turns out not to have the same extension as Y (that is to
differ from |Y |) because striving for precision and conciseness entails simplifications that go
hand in hand with minor modifications of the initially assumed extension of Y .
1.2.1 Comparing candidate definitions
Arguably a phase may exist in which different definitions, say Yd1 and Yd2 , of Y are viewed
as candidates for being given the status of a preferred definition. Candidate definitions may
be compared from different angles: conciseness of description, intelligibility, similarity with
definitions for related concepts, compliance with standards, conventions and formats, and the
proximity of |Ydi | with the intended extension |Y |.
1.2.2 Defining a single entity
Clearly Yd provides a criterion that precisely the members of |Yd| satisfy. If we intend to define
a single entity X then we proceed to define the singleton class YX such that |YX | contains only
m(X). Not all entities e have an informative definition. Consider the natural number e = 257.
In principle we may define e as the unique member of the class defined by “a natural number
reachable after 258 steps, counting from below, and starting with zero”. This definition is
hardly informative, however, and it may be considered circular in an unfortunate way.
When considering Bitcoin we find that we may be looking at a singleton class. Assuming
that Bitcoin is the process of use and maintenance of a particular evolution of an implemen-
tation of “a given specification of Bitcoin” we find that Bitcoin may not have a definition in
the same way as 257 fails to have one.
In [6] one may find some meta-theory of definitions, providing a hierarchy of forms of
definitions meant to be of use for defining the concept of money. We feel that a definition of
Bitcoin, if it can be given at all, would, just as for the concept of money, requires as a basis
the availability of some explicit meta-theory of definition. That meta-theory won’t provide a
definition of the concept of a definition, however, if uninformative circularity is to be avoided.
Unavoidably those who agree on concepts defined by means of “definitions” need to agree on
“what is a definition” laid down in less rigorous ways.
1.2.3 Typing
Typing of an entity X as an alternative to defining an entity X proceeds by determining a so-
called type T for X . Now the extension |T | of T should constitute a class of sufficiently X-like
3We can talk about cars without having made up our mind about the “carness” of a wreck. The latter issue
being deferred to the phase of precisely defining cars, preferably guided by having an objective for giving that
definition at hand.
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entities so that the assertion that X is a T makes much sense as an initial piece of information
about X . Different types of the same X may provide further information about it. With a
base type of X we will denote a type for X which can be used as a first characterization of
“what kind of entity X is”.
Providing a type for X may require the introduction of a new type description. That
corresponds to the result of finding a definition of a class with a larger extension than the
entity X alone.
1.2.4 Describing
We will use description as a term to denote any manner for indicating a class of entities of
whatsoever kind. Typically one would start out with a description of X and then proceed
towards either proposing a type for X or a definition for X . Obviously in this approach the
meta-theory of definition won’t apply to descriptions.
1.3 Problem statement
Our question is (i) to argue that BT(Bitcoin) is non-empty, and (ii) to determine an opti-
mal base type (or preferred base type), named OBT(Bitcoin), in BT(Bitcoin). A type B in
BT(Bitcoin) can be used to explain what kind of thing Bitcoin is in an initial explanation from
first principles of it. We do not claim that on a priori grounds the existence of a satisfactory
answer to this question is guaranteed.4
1.3.1 Methodological difficulty
The problem of finding an optimal type OBT(X) in BT(X), for some kind X , can only be
stated if some description of X has already been found. This suggests the presence of an
unfortunate circularity in our problem statement. In fact there is no circularity because we
may assume that X is a candidate member of BT(X), it might even be evaluated as being
optimal.
Nevertheless we must assume that X has been characterized in a preliminary fashion by
means of one or more descriptions that characterize to some extent “what X is”, that is a
preliminary indication of |X |. The difficulty is that the question seems to be stated in terms
of its answer. Rather than indicating a circularity, it appears that the mentioned difficulty
indicates that the problem of finding an optimal type for an entity is an optimization problem,
that may admit a stepwise solution starting with an initial candidate solution.
4The original paper on Bitcoin is [35]. We refer to the paragraph “Taking Bitcoin Seriously” of [10] for a
statement on the risks of considering Bitcoin from a scholarly perspective. For a technical survey of Bitcoin
see e.g. [18]. For some legal information on Bitcoin we refer to [21]. We are not convinced that trying to
classify Bitcoin “as a money” requires reconsidering the very concept of money (a viewpoint found in [33]).
An exploration of the concept of money may be found in [6], where special emphasis is given to the notion of
a money of account of which a virtual money is considered a special case.
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1.3.2 Initial kind descriptions
Let IKD(X), the initial kind description of X , be a reasonably clear indication of which Y ’s are
in of the same kind as X . IKD(X) may be quite verbose, it may be too technical still requiring
a useful abstraction, it may make use of analogies, it may be a heterogeneous collection of
different characterizations al of which are supposed to pertain somehow to those Y ’s which
are supposed to be of the same kind as X . At the same time we allow for the situation that
the description is redundant as well as marginally inconsistent. We call an IKD initial because
that kind of description is a starting point of the search for an (optimal) element in IKD(X).
In the case of Bitcoin candidates of an IKD abound in the literature. Below we propose
an IKD for Bitcoin. Our proposal for IKD(Bitcoin) represents a self-made combination of
statements about Bitcoin regularly found on the internet.
1.3.3 IKD(Bitcoin), an initial kind description of Bitcoin
IKD(Bitcoin) reads thus: Bitcoin is a remarkably successful P2P system, mainly consisting of
open source clients, which exists since early 2009, having been started up by (at the time of
writing) an anonymous programmer or group of programmers. As a tool Bitcoin provides its
clients a cryptology based informational money. Amounts in the system are expressed in the
unit BTC. The essential feature of Bitcoin is that consists of a P2P network only and at the
same time prevents double spending effectively. Bitcoin is also claimed to allow its users a
high degree of anonymity. That virtue for the system has been contested by various authors
since 2012.
1.3.4 Moneyness and money-likeness
Moneyness is the circumstance that a certain system represents a money (e.g. see [31]). Rather
than a binary variable taking values yes and no, moneyness is a matter of degree. With high
or significant moneyness we mean that an artifact class could, in principle, be used as a money.
The artifact is money-like if its functionality resembles that of a money, though only in part.
We assume that a money-like system or artifact may be further removed from a money
than an artifact with a moderate degree of moneyness. Thus we will assume “money-likeness”
may be present in some artifact class to some significant degree while moneyness is not.
Claiming that a system or artifact X is money-like requires taking some position concerning
the functions of money which X realizes. It is plausible that the money of exchange function
is considered indispensable while the money of account function is considered less prominent.
Ownership (or possession) of quantities of X must bring with it a bundle of rights resembling
that of a quantity of (well-recognized) money. For instance selling one’s holding of X at any
time to anyone must be a right.
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2 Criticizing proposed types for Bitcoin
We will first list some proposals for typing Bitcoin and we will argue why these proposals
should be rejected.
2.1 IKD(Bitcoin)
IKD(Bitcoin) does not qualify as an element of BT(Bitcoin) for at least the following reasons:
1. Mentioning double spending attacks should not enter OBT(Bitcoin) though it might be
mentioned in some types in BT(Bitcoin). We don’t claim that double spending might
be permitted, but we merely claim that singling out one of many possible failures is
premature when designing an OBT fair any artifact (including Bitcoin).
2. Success is not implied by any optimal base type. Successful artifacts in OBT(Bitcoin)
constitute a proper subtype OBTs(Bitcoin) of OBT(Bitcoin).
3. The year of birth of Bitcoin is an unnecessary detail, which is not an expected entry in
any type description in BT(Bitcoin).
4. It being cryptology based is reasonably considered an unnecessary refinement.
5. No mention is made of the status problem: is Bitcoin a money. The suggestion that
Bitcoin’s status is “money” follows too easily from the phrasing of IKD(Bitcoin).
2.2 Cryptocurrency (CC)
Bitcoin is often called a cryptocurrency (CC). The underlying assumption must be that there
is a class of so-called cryptocurrencies to which Bitcoin belongs. We criticize the classification
on the following grounds:
1. A cryptocurrency must be a currency.5 But confirming the status of a “system” as being
a currency depends on a plurality of observers some of whom may require that a certain
acceptance or usage must have been arrived at by a system before it can be classified as
such. Upon its inception Bitcoin did not possess that level of acceptance, and for that
reason Bitcoin has not started its existence as a cryptocurrency.
2. Being a cryptocurrency is a status that a system may or may not acquire over time.6
Assuming that Bitcoin is considered to be a cryptocurrency at some stage then there will
5This inference is debatable, but we consider the term cryptocurrency confusing it it does not mean some-
thing roughly equivalent to the following: an informational currency, complying with generally accepted re-
quirements for “currencyness” (or equivalently moneyness), for which control (of agents over amounts and
corresponding inspections and transactions) has been organized by means of encryption and decryption rather
than by means of restricted access policies based on conjectural pseudomonopresence of passwords (see [9]) or
on physical access restrictions.
6From [4] we quote the question “Does Bitcoin have what it takes to become a serious candidate for a
long-lived stable currency, or is it yet another transient fad?” This phrasing suggest that Bitcoin might be
considered a candidate currency, and that a currency need not be either long lived or stable.
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most likely be variations (alternative designs and systems) of Bitcoin around (perhaps
hardly used anymore) which have not been that successful. Such alternative systems
should be given the same type, so that Bitcoin might be considered a successful instance
of that type. Clearly CC cannot be that type as it contains only systems that have
already become successful to a significant extent.
3. Because being a cryptocurrency is the primary success criterion for Bitcoin its classifi-
cation as a cryptocurrency amounts to a value judgement or a quality assessment rather
than as an initial type.7
We conclude that as an initial top-level classification for Bitcoin CC is not plausible. That
is consistent with the viewpoint that at some stage (and/or in the eyes of some observers)
Bitcoin may be or become a system of class CC.
2.3 Digital currency (DC)
The “problem” with digital currency as a member of BT(Bitcoin) is similar to the problem
mentioned above with CC. We prefer IM over DC as in general we prefer money over currency
as a general term and moreover we consider “digital” to carry an implementation bias which
“informational” avoids.
2.4 Informational money (IM)
The difficulty with informational money (IM) as an original class for Bitcoin is precisely
the same as for cryptocurrency. Assuming that an informational money is a money, the
classification expresses a level of achievement that should not be presupposed.8
Our objection to using digital money as an original class for Bitcoin is the same. Stating
that Bitcoin can be typed as an informational money need not be understood as an acknowl-
edgement of its status as an unlimited success. Success is a matter of size of circulation and
usage. Success is not meant to imply that no alternative is superior.
2.5 Informational near-money (INM)
In [9]) Bitcoin has been classified as an informational near-money. The problem of this classi-
fication is that the distance between near-moneys and monies is quite subjective. Near-money
says no more than “money-like but perhaps not a money”. Classifying Bitcoin as an in-
formational near-money rather than as an informational money solves the problem that its
success in terms of realizing “moneyness” is not presupposed, but it is unclear to what extent
“near-moneyness” is a criterion of partial success of a so-called near money.
7Classifying every book as a bestseller is a similar mistake, and so is classifying every song as a hit.
8In [5] the term informaticology (IY) has been explored. In that work Informaticology (IY) is decomposed
as: IY = CS + DS + FS = Computer Science + Data Science + Fiction Science. IM has roots in each of these
components. The present paper may be classified as a contribution to the exploration of informaticology of
informational money.
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2.6 Virtual money (VM)
The phrase virtual money shares with informational money and cryptocurrency that it may
prematurely oversell Bitcoin as a money (or currency). Besides raising that objection to a
classification of Bitcoin as a virtual money, it is hard to make sense of virtuality in this setting
as like with virtual memory it would suggest that we are not looking at real money but merely
at a virtual look alike of it. In [6] an interpretation of virtual money has been given which
takes the unreal aspect into account. Nevertheless, that particular view of virtual money
provides no incentive for classifying Bitcoin as such.
2.7 Denationalized money (DM)
A denationalized money is issued by a private party. Although issuing of Bitcoin is very
distributed and potentially fully anonymous it is not under control of any state. For that
reason it merits the qualification denationalized. DM is less plausible as a type because it
implies that the status of a money has been achieved. The criticism regarding DM as a base
type for Bitcoin is essentially the same as for CC, DC, and IM.
The Austrian economic school constitutes a source for the viewpoint that monies ought to
be denationalized. The Austrian school economist Hayek is often seen as an economist the
ideas of whom are materializing with Bitcoin.9
2.8 Bitpenny implementation: with Bitpenny a suitable Abstract
Money Type
In [10] we have put forward the suggestion that Bitpenny represents an abstract logical specifi-
cation of the service that one imagines that Bitcoin ideally will provide. For instance Bitpenny
achieves by magic that double spending will not occur, while Bitcoin requires sophisticated
machinery to implement that property. Bitpenny would represent an Abstract Money Type
(AMT). Abstract Money Types have money structures as implementations in the same way
as Abstract Data Types have data structures as their implementations. Money structures are
as remote from real money as data structures are from real data.
Money structures are processes which evolve in time. Conceivably a money-structure mi-
grates from the status of a near-money to the status of a money and back. Indeed being
qualified as a money structure Km compliant with Tm (an AMT, thus Km ∈ |Tm|) reflects
no social acceptance in a particular state of the structure (as it operates in the real world at
some time t) Ktm of Km as a money. K
t
m may be merely classified as being money-like.
In the same way Kd being accepted as a data structure compliant with ADT Td reflects
no social acceptance of a particular state Ktd of Kd as containing data. K
t
d may be merely
qualified as a data-like state (of Kd).
Apart from the name Bitpenny which is merely a placeholder for better names, a weakness
of this typing of Bitcoin is that Abstract Money Types have yet to be defined and developed.
9In [37] Bitcoin is examined from the perspective of compliance with principles of the Austrian school.
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In principle, however, this may be a way to go about typing systems like Bitcoin on the long
run.
2.9 Attributes and qualifications
If a car is of type CAR then a red car may be viewed as an item in the intersection of types CAR
and RED. However, it may be more convincing to consider redness as an attribute (property,
or qualification), which applies to entities contained in types or defined by definitions. Some
qualities, or claimed qualities, of Bitcoin are best viewed as attributes which do not represent
types.
3 Attributes for or properties of Bitcoin
We first list some qualifications for Bitcoin which we consider to be less plausible as type
descriptions. When contemplating types for Bitcoin below we do not expect to see these
qualifications mentioned. Such qualifications play a role when moving from a type description
to narrower type description or to a definition.
3.1 A system for electronic transactions not relying on trust
This is an original qualification from [35].
3.2 P2P system
Bitcoin was designed as a P2P system. Currently users of Bitcoin must trust the collective of
miners and the pure P2P status is becoming less obvious.
By stating that Bitcoin is a P2P system not enough information is given about its expected
role. (We don’t speak of objectives as almost nothing is known (at this stage) about the
objectives of Bitcoin’s designers.)
Typing Bitcoin as a open source P2P system provides little progress, and it may even be
wrong altogether, as there seems to be no requirement that Bitcoin clients are realized as open
source programs.
3.3 Reduced product set finance (RPSF)
In [11, 12] we have put forward the notion of an RPSF in order to describe financial systems
from which certain features (and corresponding financial products) are banned. One might
consider Bitcoin an RPSF because it does not allow for governance by means of management
of the monetary base.
Classifying Bitcoin as an RPSF is not plausible at this stage because like money as well as
like currency, finance expresses requirements on a system that Bitcoin may not yet meet.
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3.4 The first successful digital coin: a landmark in the history of
information security
One of us has a vested interest in the history of information security (see [32]) and viewing P2P
based money-like systems as a historic necessity of which Bitcoin is a first realistic exemplar
may be justified and may on the long run be what will take place. What counts against this
approach to Bitcoin typing is that it insufficiently expresses the important aspect that Bitcoin
may still have a long and successful future existence and evolution ahead of it (and regarding
proposals for its improvement see [4]). In addition not everybody may consider Bitcoin to be
a success as a coin, if being a coin counts for anything less than being a currency.10
3.5 Converting rejected base type options to attributes
When criticizing IM as a base type for Bitcoin one may uphold that it is an attribute that
Bitcoin might be a proto IM, where a pro to X is an entity which is expected (hoped, intended)
to evolve sooner or later into an X . Now it is reasonable to have proto CC, proto DC, proto
IM, and proto DM as attributes of Bitcoin.
4 Candidate types for BT(Bitcoin)
Given some kind X , which may be an artifact kind, or a natural kind, finding a suitable type
in BT(X) requires (i) the preparatory collection of a number of options, that is candidate
members, (ii) validating the conclusion that BT(X) is non-empty, and (iii) choosing an optimal
element OBT(X) of BT(X).
4.1 Candidate cryptocurrency (CCC)
Candidate cryptocurrency (CCC) may well be a type in BT(Bitcoin), and CCC refers to a
larger class than CC, while it is contained in MLICcp as defined below. A disadvantage of
CCC as a type is that there is no known procedure for leaving the candidate status. Another
problem is that some may think that it can be shown that Bitcoin cannot acquire CC status,
from which it would follow that Bitcoin is not a CCC either.
4.2 Cryptocoinage (CCo)
A cryptocoinage (CCo) plausibly refers to the coinage of a larger money-like system. As
coinage is unlikely to refer to an entire money including each of its money types, this is not a
plausible typing of Bitcoin. The name Bitcoin is suggestive of it being about coins but we fail
to see in what sense the quantities of Bitcoin are to be viewed as coins.
10As an open source program Bitcoin is successful already, by having many participants tot its P2P system,
by capturing the imagination of public media, by driving the emergence of a dedicated hardware industry for
mining, and by forcing all major financial institutions to issue policy statements about it.
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4.3 Internet based business (IBB)
Possession of BTC quantities may be considered as a proportional share in an new kind
of internet startup (now in year 6 of its existence). Mining is the method for issuing and
distributing new shares. New shares are issued at a diminishing rate, and the hypothetical
objective of the business is to become dominant factor in what is called today the monetary
system. Bitcoin shares constitute the money at the same time. If Bitcoin happens to become a
dominant factor in the world-wide monetary system the value of a BTC will rise astronomically
(though not expressible in the Euro’s from the past anymore).
The business model is to become strong on the internet in an underground style. In [9]
it has been argued that this view allows an approach to the determination of the value of a
BTC. Thinking along this lines the current rate of EUR 600 to a single BTC will correspond
with a 20 year survival probability of Bitcoin (as an internet based business) of 10−5.
IBB is a reasonable type for Bitcoin if one intends to explain the economic risks, both
upside and downside, of an “investment” in Bitcoin (i.e. buying BTC against EUR). As a
business model IBB is really new, which is an attractive aspect of this candidate type. But
we believe that the virtue of IBB as a type for Bitcoin is metaphorical rather than intrinsic.
4.4 Investment scheme (IS)
Assuming that the store of value function of Bitcoin outweighs its money of exchange function,
one may suggest that it constitutes an investment scheme IS). This view is valid if BTC is
bought and sold in exchange for conventional monies only. It seems rather implausible that
Bitcoin can survive on this basis, but at the same that very state of affairs cannot be excluded
and for that reason we consider “investment scheme” to be a conceivable type for Bitcoin.
An individual user viewing Bitcoin as an investment scheme only is currently considered to
be a speculator, because there is no intrinsic argument for BTC to increase its value against
conventional monies.11
4.5 Multi-player computer game (MPCG)
One may consider Bitcoin to constitute a distributed and multi-player computer game (MPCG).
The game is to acquire control over as many BTC as possible. Good gaming is rewarded by
other gamers who buy accounts. As a side-track all participants collectively try to make
progress concerning attacks on the secure hash function SHA-256.
Viewing Bictoin as an MPCG deviates from a common understanding of its purpose but
as a typing it may be useful for some purposes.
11The number of outstanding BTC will have some maximum below 21 million in a phase where mining
results balance losses of Bitcoin accessibility by users who physically use secret keys to active accounts. From
that point onwards losses (of al users together) will outweigh mining (creation). On the very long run, and
under the assumption that Bitcoin loss will always have some positive probability each BTC will get lost.
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4.6 Informational money-like commodity (IMLC)
Bitcoin provides tradable quantities, with money-like status. On that basis it may be viewed
as a (system implementing a) money-like commodity (MLC). Because its exists (or at least it
can can exist) in terms of information only Bitcoin is also an informational MLC. We notice
that MLC is also a plausible candidate for a type in BT(Bitcoin), but we consider it to be
significantly less informative than IMLC. In item 4.7 below we will discuss the way in which
Bitcoin might be considered to constitute a commodity.
4.7 Money-like informational commodity (MLIC)
Viewing Bitcoin as a system providing a platform offering the following features:
1. a system for giving agents access, and
2. facilitating the exchange of that access, to
3. informationally given amounts measured in BTC the unit of Bitcoin), through
4. the scarce resource of collections of accessible (to the agents) secret keys, and
5. “a Bitcoin” as a unit of access within this system,
one may grasp how Bitcoin may refer to a commodity, the substance of which consists of
information that is independent of any accidental carrier of it, while access to it is scarce.12
Thus, in more detail, said commodity amenable to being in the possession of an agent,
consists of: conjectural pseudo-monopresent (that is secret) “keyware” (that is collections
of keys), the size (commodity measure, commodity weight, commodity volume) of which is
determined as the sum of the amounts these secret keys give access to.
After an exchange the same amounts are accessible from other secret keys, equally assumed
to enjoy conjectural pseudomono-presence, though in the possession of another agent.
The exchange value of a commodity positively correlates with its size, and with the public
trust in the pseudo-monopresence (see [9]) of the (secret) keys from the perspective of the
agent currently possessing the keyware.
Playing the role of a money, we will speak of a money-like informational commodity
(MLIC).13
4.7.1 Ownership and possession of MLIC
A vast legal and philosophical literature explains concepts like property, title to ownership,
ownership of property, and possession. We mention [19] as an example of such works. In that
paper the coming about of property through the rule of first possession is scrutinized.
12Informational commodity is an subclass of information object, a class for which a conceptual analysis can
be found in [17].
13We notice that viewing information as a commodity has a long history, e.g. see [16]. In [23] explicit
mention is made that information as a commodity will have a price, plausibly in excess of the cost of delivery,
whereas information in the public domain need not.
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We will assume that the commodities underlying an MLIC can be in the possession of agents.
Possession of a quantity of the commodity provides an agent with a number of capabilities
that are self-explanatory from the perspective of a conventional functionality of money. The
extent to which agents can be owners of an item may vary from case to case. By speaking of an
MLIC no commitment is made to a particular bundle of rights which is implied by ownership
or possession of an item. Technically the same MLIC may exist in different legal regimes.14
4.7.2 Preference of MLIC over IMLC
As a type for Bitcoin MLIC is acceptable as well as IMLC, though we prefer MLIC because:
1. Bitcoin cannot be an IMLC without being an informational commodity.
2. The phrase informational commodity is relatively new and without it being accepted
IMLC is hard to make sense of.
3. Without insisting that Bitcoin keyware is a substance constituting an informational
commodity, the claim that its secret keys give access to a commodity seems to be un-
convincing.
The use of the concept of a commodity requires justification. About the question what is
a commodity we take a quote from [1], which as we claim applies to Bitcoin keyware:
To say that something is a commodity is to claim that the norms of the market are
appropriate for regulating its production, exchange, and enjoyment. To the extent
that moral principles or ethical ideals preclude the application of market norms to
a good we may say that the good is not a proper commodity.
4.7.3 Remarks on commodification and informational commodities
Necessarily an MLIC is a kind of commodity. In other words MLIC is a subtype of commodi-
ties. Commodities may come about in different ways. Individual commodities are build, pro-
duced, generated, or configured, whereas a specific commodity type may come about through
a process of commodification. Commodification transforms a type of disparate (though some-
how related) entities into a class of entities that can be exchanged on a free market and which
are paid for by money.15
We suggest that Bitcoin may be considered a result (among many other such results) of
commodification (of circulating amounts) starting from digital monies that are still under state
control just as conventional monies like EUR and USD. Such monies seem not to meet the
definition of a commodity because free market forces are not allowed to regulate their market
value.
14This independence of circulation technology from legal settings is discussed below in paragraph 6.1.1 on
physical coins.
15In [42] commodification is defined as: “the process by which objects and activities come to be evaluated
primarily in terms of their exchange value in the context of trade in addition to any use-value such commodities
might have.”
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In [22] the phrase informational commodity is used for private information which is owned
by an individual. The institution of ownership for that particular kind of commodity is called
privacy. As a type of that sort of information we suggest: personal data oriented informational
commodity (PDOIC). Privacy indicates that commodities of type BLIC may be owned by an
owner with the effect that all forms of access by non-owners are a breach of the rights the
owner enjoys in virtue of his ownership. The use of informational commodity is justified in
this case because there is a market for such information, even if privacy is about regulating
and constraining that market.
4.8 Partial informational money (PIM)/partial cryptocurrency (PCC)
With a partial money we may denote any near-money or money-like commodity which can
fulfil some selected subset, (possibly all) of the functions required of a money, and which in
addition may fulfil these only partially what is expected for these selected functions. Given
an understanding of an informational money (IM) or a cryptocurrency (CC), one may derive
from this definition of a partial money what a partial IM (PIM) or a partial CC (PCC) can
be.
Both PIM and PCC are plausible types in BT(Bitcoin) and plausible candidates for the
role of an OBT(Bitcoin).
5 MLIC, our proposed type OBT(Bitcoin)
The main contribution of our paper is formulating the proposal that MLIC is in BT(Bitcoin)
and moreover that MLIC = OBT(Bitcoin).16
5.1 Motivation
We see the following arguments in favor of setting OBT(Bitcoin) = MLIC.
1. MLIC is very compact and it specifies a large class of systems from which Bitcoin might
emerge as the winner.
2. MLIC seems not to make any false or even contested claims.
3. MLIC is applicable to Bitcoin during all stages of its “life”.
4. MLIC is preferred over PIM and PCC because it is “more consistent” with the eventuality
that Bitcoin may not be classified as a money after all in which case its final type would
probably be neither PIM nor PCC because arguments for witholding Bitcoin the status
of a money would stand in the way.
16In http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of cryptocurrencies for a survey of so-called cryptocurrencies,
all of which we propose to classify as MLICs also. See also [39].
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5.2 Weaknesses of the type MLIC in its role of OBT(Bitcoin)
Typing Bitcoin as an MLIC, however, leads to many subsequent questions some of which may
point to weaknesses of this proposal.
1. Bitcoin is internet based; MLIC fails to indicate that Bitcoin is only useful for those
agents who can access the internet freely, to the extent that they can run a specific
downloaded client. This restriction may be at odds with property rights on a specific
Bitcoin informational commodity to which an agent may be entitled.
2. A potentially problematic aspect of MLIC is the use of commodity as a root concept.
Indeed one may claim that amounts are commodity-like at best but are not commodities
proper. This objection may be remedied by viewing “money-like commodity” as a
semantic unit rather than as referring to a commodity which in addition is money-
like. (A similar situation is found with “free will” which according to some philosophers
is not pointing to a will (state of willing) that in addition happens to be free.)
3. MLIC fails to express the fact that no backing of value for BTC holdings from outside
the system is provided. All value of Bitcoin holdings is to be realized within or by the
Bitcoin system, through users who have trust and confidence in the system.
5.3 Counter arguments and risk analysis
Many arguments against the typing of Bitcoin as an MLIC may be brought forward. It seems
that legal, economic, monetary, and informaticological perspectives are so disparate that it is
inconceivable that a single type proposed for Bitcoin is equally defensible from each of these
perspectives.
For instance, while moving from a commodity to a money (and back) may be a matter of
evolution from an economic perspective, that may not be the case from a legal perspective.
And once Bitcoin like systems become mainstream components of computing infrastructures
technical names (like database, laptop, cloud, computer network) may become more prominent
that use-related types.
In [36] it is argued that information is intangible and that there is a larger distance between
information and its embodiment than with other, more conventional goods. This argument
hardly applies to a Bitcoin secret key the possession of which (under the assumption of conjec-
tural pseudo-monopresence) is very much linked to its embodiment. Thus, it must be accepted
at least for some informational commodities (e.g. the one’s we are contemplating in the con-
text of Bitcoin) a notion of possession, and the corresponding uniqueness of a possessor, make
perfect sense.
We consider it implausible that someone would criticize classifying Bitcoin as an MLIC on
the grounds that it is to early too award it that status, for instance in the light of deficient
regulation (see [30]).
Of course some may consider the classification of Bitcoin as an MLIC as being too cautious, a
possibility which brings us to contemplating MLIC maturity levels. Our use of “informational”
may be criticized for lacking compliance with a preferred philosophy of information (see [20]).
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In [15] a critique of the design of Bitcoin mining is given. Such arguments do not stand in
the way if classifying Bitcoin as an MLIC but may constitute objections against assigning it
a higher maturity level such as the level IMoE/MfSoV below.
In any case a risk that we see in opting for MLIC in the role of OBT(Bitcoin) is that legal
differences between commodity and money turn out to be rather large. Considered from a
legal perspective, control over a secret key of a Bitcoin address may prove to be more remote
from the possession of a quantity of some commodity than it proves to be from the possession
of an amount of money.
5.4 Ramifications of MLIC
Assuming that MLIC serves as a base type for Bitcoin and Bitcoin like systems one is led to
the question how large this class of systems might be. For instance one may wonder to what
extent cryptographic techniques are necessary for the realization of each conceivable MLIC.
We briefly consider two conceivable alternative means of implementation.
5.4.1 Cryptology based MLIC: CBMLIC
Bitcoin and similar systems are essentially based on an extensive and essential use of cryp-
tographic techniques and access control seems to play a secondary role only. The role of
cryptography will stay prominent as Bitcoin evolves and the role of access control may in-
crease. For this reason we consider the type CBMLIC (for Cryptology Based MLIC) to be a
valid element of BT(Bitcoin). CBMLIC is a refinement of MLIC and we don’t prefer it over
MLIC as a candidate OBT(Bitcoin) because it is still possible that each MLIC is cryptology
based in which case the addition of this aspect to a notation for the type would be futile in
hindsight.
5.4.2 Access control based MLIC: ACBMLIC
It can be imagined that an MLIC makes use of password protected data only. That will
probably not be an open source P2P system. We suggest that ACBMLIC is coined as a type
for which no instances have been proposed at this stage. If ACBMLIC turns out to be empty
then by consequence CBMLIC is equal to MLIC.
6 Alternatives for MLIC
Although the future of money is probably informational, it would be too soon to write off non-
informational monies or non-informational money-like commodities as being, no more than
a thing from the past. When contemplating alternatives to MLIC it becomes important to
consider partial monies or rather compartments of monies. On the physical side, to understand
the importance of metallic coins as a component of the Euro system it is relatively unimportant
that Euro coins have a fixed value in terms of Euro. Small variations can be handled and one
may imagine a situation where coins have fluctuating values and a central bank sees to it that
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these fluctuations are not too big by means of targeted interventions, which are not meant to
stabilize coin value under all circumstances and with perfect precision.
6.1 Physical MLC: PMLC
The intuition of money is often connected with coins. At a closer inspection coins are fairly
difficult to understand. In [6] an attempt was made to understand “the logic of coins”.
6.1.1 Logic of coins
To see the difficulties with understanding a logic of coins one imagines the task to define
forgery. What is a false coin? Is it a coin that fails to comply with requirements on its physical
constitution, or is it a coin that started its circulation in a fraudulent manner. The difference
between both approaches is large. Similarly there is a remarkable distinction between coins
and banknotes resulting from these having unique identification numbers: from two identical
banknotes at least one must be the product of counterfeit. And if no physical anomalies can
be established one is forced to accept a theory of counterfeit that takes the entire circulation
of banknotes into account.
A thought experiment relevant for Bitcoin is to imagine a PMLC which constitutes of a
certain range of coins only. Of particular importance is to grasp the ramifications of ownership,
possession, holding, lending, and stealing. On needs a model where a community of agents
makes use of coins. Each coin c can stand in various relations to an agent P : P may own
c, P may be in the possession of c (the contrast between ownership and possession has been
analyzed originally in detail by Kant, see e.g. [43], and subsequently by many other authors), or
P may be a holder of c. At this stage ramifications abound. In [34] four views of property (and
ownership) are discussed, each of which may potentially give rise to another view on how coins
relate to agents in terms of ownership, possession, and capabilities of these. In [38] one of these
views, so-called multi-variable essentialism, has been worked out operationally and in detail
by giving six rules of conduct that may be considered constitutive of the concept of owning a
property, while none of these rules is considered absolutely necessary in each individual case.
Different bundles of rights may be attached to owners, possessors, and holders, of a coin,
thus leading to different legal settings for a coin circulation based on the same circulation
mechanics. We expect that surveying the different options in the case of metallic coins will
shed light on the different possibilities in this respect for an IM. Investigating this matter
seems not to have been carried out in the existing literature on coin circulation
In [9] “exclusively informational money” (EXIM) was “coined” for denoting an IM where
ownership is reduced to possession. By looking at metallic coin circulation models, legal and
philosophical aspects of such “exotic” legal options (for different relevant bundles of rights)
can be studied without being detracted by the complexities of distributed computing. In [26]
intention is put forward as a prerequisite for possession, and different views are contrasted
regarding the perspective (intention) of future ownership being a prerequisite for possession
as well. Following this line of thought an EXIM cannot even be defined without making use
of a notion of intention, and in addition it may hardly have a place in a world dominantly
inhabited by artificial agents.
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6.1.2 Advantages of (metallic) coins
Looking at physical coins as a means of exchange which itself constitutes a commodity used
exactly for that purpose, the following advantages of metallic coins are noticeable:
1. Use for exchange is possible in a significant range of seemingly adverse circumstances:
outdoor, windy weather, wet and dry, low and high temperature, during a power outage.
2. Use for exchange is technically simple.
3. Safeguarding the physical security of coins is comparable (and no more difficult) to
maintaining the physical safety of one’s body.
4. The possession of coins can be demonstrated to a potential partner before a transaction
is performed.
5. Storage is relatively easy and can be performed for a very long time.
We expect that money-like coins will be around for a very long time, in the light of these ad-
vantages. That does not necessarily imply that such coins must be pegged to entities/quantities
in another money-like system which plays the role of a (real) money. Although these advan-
tages are well-known for metallic coins it is quite possible that new materials allow for the
design and mass production of even better coins.
6.2 Computational MLC: CMLC
Computational money unlike informational money has the property that each occurrence of it
requires a functioning machine. For instance even if one has a security code memorized that
allows access to some chip card containing a money like quantity, only the working chip card
once activated via the security code will allow spending the (near) money (or the money-like
commodity) that it contains. If that chip card is destroyed the commodity it contains will
disappear simultaneously with it.17
This differs from the situation of Bitcoin where one may imagine that all blockchain data
are printed, that all wallet information is physically stored, that all machines are destroyed
and that in a second round every user get a new machine. Subsequently all data written
on paper (or on disk) are loaded into the various machines and the entire Bitcoin system is
again live. With a computational money or more generally with a computational MLIC a
corresponding course of events is unimaginable.
7 MLIC maturity levels
Supposing that an MLIC say XYZcoin progresses from the initial MLIC classification to the
stage of an informational money (IM). Now having IM status implies that the moneyness of
XYZcoin has been sufficiently generally accepted, the latter depending on one’s philosophy
17THe Dutch Chipknip is an example of this.
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of money. It is practical that XYZcoin’s progression through the hierarchy of maturity levels
towards the IM stage moves trough stages that admit explicit naming as well.18 In this Section
we will propose a naming scheme for such maturity levels.
7.1 Below IM: CIMoE, IMoE
An informational money of exchange (IMoE) may fail as a money of account (MoA) and it
may mail fail to provide a (reliable) store of value (SoV, or MfSoV, money for SoV), it may fail
to provide the function of a money of documentation (MoD), that is a tool for the preservation
of historic information in excess of mere balance sheet aggregation.19
Before IMoE there is the candidate IMoE stage. An MLIC is a CIMoE if the path of
development towards the IMoE stage is conceptually clear, though there may be risks that it
will not be successful. We consider Bitcoin to have reached maturity level CIMoE. This typing
judgement implies that we consider it to provide sufficient defense against double spending
attacks (e.g. see [25]).
7.1.1 IMoE/MoD, IMoE/MoD/MoA, IMoE/MoD/MoA/MfSoV
Beyond the IMoE stage we distinguish IMoE/IMoD, where the MLIC serves as an MoE and
also as an MoD. A further stage is IMoE/MoD/IMoA, which is a stage where an MLIC serves
as an IMoE/MoD and as an MoA at the same time. Still the long term SoV functionality
may be considered problematic. If that functionality has been acquired as well we find the
maturity level IMoE/MoD/MoA/MfSoV.
Exactly which features can be productively combined in an informational money requires
further thought. At this stage many issues about the integration of these features and about
system governance, quality control, and risk management must be considered.20
7.1.2 CIM
An important intermediate stage close to IM is CIM, candidate IM. A CIM is an MLIC that
must have reached IMoE/MoD/MoA/MfSoV maturity. Moreover, XYZcoin has reached CIM
level if it has become sufficiently clear how XYZcoin can further develop in terms of usage and
support structure so that it would eventually qualify as an IM. Bitcoin has not yet reached
CIM status because it is not sufficiently clear that the MfSoV functionality is potentially
performed sufficiently well by any Bitcoin-like MLIC, including Bitcoin itself. CIMs compete
for IM status and achieving IM maturity is a gradual matter.
18In [24] arguments are listed for expecting demise of Bitcoin. Having a maturity level classification scheme at
hand, such arguments can be framed positively, acknowledging what has been achieved, rather than negatively.
19More functionalities of money can be distinguished, for instance MfVM (money for vending machines,
see [3].)
20For instance robustness against abuse must be taken into account (see [28]).
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7.2 IM
IM status is a very high maturity level. When having reached that status it competes with
EUR and USD on par in terms of technology and mechanisms. This stage may be quite
distant, it may never arise. And it may be transient as the evolution of an MLIC may also
involve a decrease of maturity level.
For an IM some robustness against risks is important. Nevertheless robustness a against
risks may be uncertain. The use of elliptic curve cryptography (see ECDSA in [29]) makes
it vulnerable to attacks by means of quantum computers, once in existence. We assume that
this is not an argument against Bitcoin having a CIM or IM status at some stage because we
assume that as an evolving P2P system it has the flexibility to develop towards making use
of stronger cryptographic methods when needed. A similar remark would be made in reply
to someone who considers SHA-256 (see [13] for a recent specification of that algorithm by
means of an instruction sequence) to be a critical weakness of the mining mechanism.
Coins from a conventional money can be handled anonymously. It is unclear to us to what
extent the ability to make anonymous use of a money (or of the transfer of specific items of a
particular money) must be considered “intrinsic” to a money. And if so, it is unclear to what
extent Bitcoin might even achieve CIM status, given the deficiencies concerning its anonymity
feature which have been widely documented (e.g. see [2, 14]).
7.2.1 What is an IM?
The quality of being an IM is hard to grasp in a few words. Quite difficult to assess is the
quality of an IM as a store of value. We make some remarks about this particular aspect.
• The MfSoV (money for store of value) quality of the Euro depends on one’s trust in an
open ended political process currently guided from institutions seated in Brussels and
in Frankfurt am Main. Suppose one thinks in terms of say 250 years. Is the Euro any
better than Bitcoin, who knows?
• Against which disasters, social unrest, earthquakes, inundations, fires, crimes, or other
problems, must a SoV function of money protect the holder of an amount? Is transfer
to a next generation upon the holder’s death an important matter, and if so what
requirements must be imposed. As it seems this “problem” is far from having been
solved for Bitcoin.
• One may imagine that metallic coins for Euro’s are replaced by money-like commodi-
ties, so as to undo the Euro (or any other recognized money) from the complexity of
coin circulation which introduces such aspects as loss and wear in ways foreign to the
informational world. One may also introduce physical coins as a money-like commod-
ity to a Bitcoin style MLIC. Is this form of convergence between monies a reasonable
path to contemplate? This matters if one insists that metallic coins (or banknotes) offer
their users a package of advantages that cannot be replaced by means of information
technology based equipment.
• Is it at all relevant to compare a closed world such as Bitcoin, the evolution of which is
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supposedly limited to a fairly restricted scope of technical modification and to minimal
external influence of a political nature, to a money based on an open ended political
process (such the Euro). Is it reasonable to say that the Euro provides an SoV if in fact
the EU political process constitutes (or claims to constitute) that SoV? If the “value” of
money (say in EUR) is merely a claim on the outcome of a political process, then store
of value is rather empty if the ability of the political system to materialize the claims is
undermined.
• If Euro’s don’t do much more than providing a bookkeeping of claims which may or may
not loose their value, that is Euro’s are mainly a money of account for measuring the
value of bonds, then storage of value must take place (if at all) outside the sphere of
money. The objection to an IM (supposedly still seen as a CIM) that it fails to provide a
store of claims against an important institution (an objection that has been formulated
about Bitcoin) may be valid while at the same time there is no support for the objection
that it fails to provide a store of value (which has been formulated about Bitcoin as
well).
For making this distinction between storage of claims and storage of values we will put
forward two arguments. First of all with a conventional money the institution stores the
underlying value in different ways (from storing money proper) thus undermining the
argument that a conventional money provides a store of value (and thereby weakening the
objection that an IM does not). Secondly the social acceptance and ubiquitous usage
of an IM may constitute a “real value” which is stable and may be considered being
stored, in a way that a conventional money does not. It is conceivable that precisely
because a conventional money constitutes a bookkeeping of claims its own value (as a
communicative tool) is minimal once the underlying claims are not counted to contribute
to the value
• In different words an IM (which Bitcoin might become) serves as an important part of
the communication infrastructure of a community and in that form it stores exactly the
combined value of that communication mechanism. Beyond doubt this is a real value
and at this stage it is hard to assess how it will compare with the value of assets that
underly the stability of conventional monies.
7.3 Beyond IM: RDIM, DIM
Beyond the IM stage we will distinguish two further development stages of an MLIC: RDIM,
a relatively dominant IM, which is an IM that plays a dominant role between other IMs (that
is relative to the class of MLICs), and a DIM, a dominant IM which is an IM that plays a
dominant role in comparison with all other monies.
In [9] EXIM (exclusively informational money) has been put forward as a further important
modality of an IM. Perhaps EXIM may be placed between IM and RDIM, depending on how
important the “exclusively informational” feature is seen to be.
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8 Concluding remarks
We have coined MLIC (informational money-like commodity) as a preferred type indication
(base type) for Bitcoin. We have compared this meta-type to several other candidates for a
preferred base type for Bitcoin.
In [8] the notion of a conjectural ability has been promoted as a means to assess what a
proposed theory might achieve in pragmatic terms. Viewing our typing of Bitcoin as a theory
of Bitcoin, one may ask which conjectural abilities an appreciation of this theory may create.
The ability that we assume to be created by an appreciation of this (fragment of) theory on
Bitcoin is to allow for a systematic discussion of its development through all stages including
an initial stage and a possible demise without being constrained by the implications of it being
a money or a near-money.
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